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Abstract
A persistent question in industrial economics is the underpinning of the link between market concentration and
price. How much of the link can be attributed to market power and how much to market efficiency? This paper develops a theoretical model to address that question. Applied to the US portland cement industry, the model indicates
that both impacts matter. In relative terms, however, the market power effect is twice as large as the efficiency effect.
An implication for merger policy is that the beneficial efficiency effects of mergers may not be obtained without the
detrimental market power effects as well.

Kwoka, 1979; Clarke et al. 1984). Third, as Kardasz and
Stollery (1995) have shown, in samples dominated by
small firms, a negative coefficient on concentration
supports rather than refutes the collusion hypothesis. Fourth, regression estimates of the two effects are
not helpful in answering the fundamental question regarding the profitability–concentration relation. That
is, how much of the correlation is due to efficiency and
how much is due to collusion? Fifth, treatment of concentration as an exogenous variable does not accommodate the hypothesized link from greater efficiency
to higher concentration.
Two tests which circumvent some of the limitations
have recently been conducted at the single-industry
level. Using estimates from a Bresnahan (1982) type conjectural oligopoly model, Rosenbaum (1994) inferred
efficiency and collusion in the cement industry from
changes over the sample period in marginal costs and
price-cost margins, respectively. Azzam (1997) used a
framework similar to Appelbaum’s (1982) to separate
the market-power effect of increased concentration in
the beef-packing industry from its cost-efficiency effect.
Unlike Rosenbaum, Azzam formally linked the collusion and efficiency components to industry concentration. However, neither study considered the link from
efficiency to concentration.

I. Introduction
The market power versus efficiency debate in industrial organization is well known. Proponents of the market power argument attribute the positive correlation
between market concentration and profitability to collusion. Proponents of the efficiency argument assert the
correlation reflects the superior efficiency of large firms.
So, the causal direction is not from market power to
higher profits, but from efficiency to higher profits and
higher concentration (Demsetz, 1973).
Until recently, the predominant approach to resolve
the conflicting interpretations has been to use cross-industry samples, and include both market share and concentration as determinants of firm profits.1 The presence
of efficiency is taken to be associated with a positive and
significant market share effect, that of collusion with a
positive and significant concentration effect.
The approach has several limitations. First, how
the two effects are exactly linked to profits is not clear
from the regression. Second, even if one subscribes to
the implied efficiency effect of market share, and to the
implied collusion effect of concentration, when market share of the larger firms is highly correlated with
concentration, it is difficult to discriminate between
the collusion and efficiency hypotheses (Philips, 1976;
1 See

for example Ravenscraft (1983).
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In this paper the link from concentration to collusion and efficiency, and the link from efficiency to concentration are formalized. In so doing, a way to testing
Williamson’s (1968) policy tradeoffs, and Demsetz’s efficiency hypothesis is provided. The framework is a hybrid of Azzam’s procedure for separating the market
power effect from the cost-efficiency effect of industrial
concentration, and Clarke and Davies’ (1982) work on
the joint determination of structure and performance.
The paper is in six sections. The next section briefly
describes the portland cement industry which is used
for empirical analysis. The theoretical model is developed in the third section. The model explicitly identifies the concentration-related market power and market
efficiency components of price. It also creates a link between firm differential efficiency and market concentration. Section IV describes the empirical approximation
of the theoretical model and discusses the data. Results
are presented in Section V. These results unambiguously show that rising market power raises price while
rising efficiency lowers price. The market power effect,
however, is twice the magnitude of the efficiency effect.
Hence, overall, increases in concentration increase price.
The results also show that concentration is an increasing
function of the variance in costs across firms in the market. The greater the cost variance, the more larger firms
benefit at the expense of smaller firms and the higher
the market concentration.
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put expense; electricity, used to operate related auxiliary
equipment; feed stocks; and maintenance. Furthermore,
as variable inputs are not substitutable, the process exhibits a fixed factor production function. Marginal costs
do vary across kilns, however, based on respective technologies, capacities and ages.
Portland cement is predominantly used in construction. Over the period 1978–1982, approximately 65% of
sales were for building construction, 31% for highway
construction, and less than 5% went towards nonconstruction activities.4 The demand for cement should be
fairly inelastic since there are few substitutes and its cost
makes up a moderate part of most construction projects.
Note that asphalt is an alternative for some highway
construction applications.
III. The Model
The starting point of the model is an industry consisting
of N firms producing a homogeneous output Q, and facing the inverse demand function
p = p(Q, Z)

where p is price, and Z is a vector of demand shifters.
Assuming the objective of the jth firm is to maximize
profits
pqj – Cj(qj, ν) – F

II. The Portland Cement Industry
Portland cement is a homogeneous producer good.
Given its low ratio of value to weight, it is shipped limited distances.2 Consequently, the US supply of portland
cement can be divided into a number of regional markets. Regional markets tend to have a limited number of
suppliers. Buying patterns tend to exhibit frequent sales.
Many firms are interconnected across regional markets.
Previous studies have found evidence of behaviors consistent with tacit collusion in this industry.3
The portland cement production technology uses calcium carbonate rock which is crushed and then combined with lime and sand for grinding. Once ground,
the raw materials are fed into a kiln where intense
heat causes chemical changes in the composition of the
feed stock. Kiln output, clinker, is then combined with
gypsum and ground again. The end result is portland
cement.
There are essentially five variable inputs into cement
production: labor; fuel (predominantly coal or natural
gas) which is used to heat the kiln and is the primary in2

(1)

(2)

where Cj is total cost, and ν is a vector of factor prices,
then that firm’s supply relation is
p = qj(1 + θj)/Qη² + cj(qj, ν)

(3)
N

where η = – (dQ/dp)(1/Q) is the semi-elasticity, θj = ∑
i≠
(dqi/dqj) is the jth firm’s conjectural variation, and cj(qj,
j
ν) is marginal cost.
If, as in Azzam, the jth firm’s cost function is assumed
to take the Generalized Leontief (GL) (Diewert, 1971)
functional form
(4)
and all firms hold identical conjectures, multiplying
both sides of Equation 3 by qj/Q and summing over the
N firms yields the industry supply relation
(5)

In 1977, for instance, 82.5% of all shipments were within a radius of 200 miles, 99.8% were for distances shorter than 500 miles (US Department of
Commerce, 1977).
3 See, for example, Rosenbaum (1994) or Jans and Rosenbaum (1996).
4 Portland Cement Association (1984).
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where H = ∑j (qj/Q)2 is the Herfindahl Index and θ is the
industry conjectural variation. Equation 5 states that, in
equilibrium, output price is the sum of two components:
an oligopoly component, as measured by the first term
on the right hand side, and a marginal cost component,
as measured by the last two terms. For a given H and η
the magnitude of the oligopoly component depends on
the type of oligopolistic behavior. The simplest type is
Cournot. In this case θ = 0. The benchmark for an industry that is more competitive than Cournot is between
zero and –1, where a value of –1 implies price-taking behavior. The benchmark for one that is less competitive
than Cournot is between 0 and the joint-profit maximizing value 1/H – 1. Solving for the jth firm’s market share
from Equation 3 yields
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IV. Empirical Application
Assuming the conduct parameter θ is a linear function of
the Herfindahl index (Rosenbaum), the empirical counterparts of Equations 5, 7 and 8 are respectively,

(11)
(12)
and

(6)
Following Clarke and Davies, summing Equation 6
over N, solving for p, substituting p back into Equation
6 and summing its square yields the Herfindahl Index
equation
(7)
where N is the number of firms in the industry, and σc2 is
the coefficient of variation of marginal costs. Assuming
the demand Equation 1 takes the semilogarithmic form
(8)
the estimating model consists of Equations 5, 7 and 8.
The tradeoff between concentration-induced market
power effects and cost-efficiency effects on price may be
measured with a constant or variable θ. If θ is assumed
constant, differentiation of Equation 5 with respect to H,
yields
(9)
Alternatively, if conduct is influenced by market concentration, as maintained in this paper, i.e., θ = θ(H), the
derivative becomes
(10)
where the first term in both Equation 9 and Equation 10
is the concentration-market-power effect, and the second
is the concentration-cost-efficiency effect. Finally, differentiation of Equation 7 with respect to σc2 gives the effect
of differential efficiency on concentration. The point estimate and standard error of the respective effects can
be obtained using the econometric estimates from the
joint model.

(13)
The θ’s, ’s, and d’s are parameters to be estimated,
and the e’s are error terms. In Equation 11, the variables
rprice, rpelec, rpfuel, rwage, and shipment are respectively, the real price of cement, the real price of electricity, the real price of fuel, the real hourly wage adjusted
for productivity, and quantity of cement shipped. Note
that the fixed proportions assumption leads to no cross
products on the input prices for the cost part of Equation 11. In Equation 12, the variable nfirm represents
the number of firms, and varcost the variance in costs
across firms. In the demand Equation 13, rhwy, rnhwy,
and rpasph are, respectively, real highway construction
expenditures, real nonhighway construction expenditures, and the real price of asphalt . Precise definition
of the variables and their sources are in the Appendix.
Mean, minimum, and maximum values of variables are
shown in Table 1.
Using Equation 10, and denoting by mpe the market power effect, and by efe the cost-efficiency effect, we
now have
Table 1. Means and ranges for variables used in estimation, N
= 321
Variable
rprice
herf
shipment
nfirm
rpelec
rpfuel
rwage
rhwy
rnhwy
rpasph
varcost

Mean
50.803
0.2615
3226.82
6
12.9962
2.0617
0.1169
1760.06
3.7472
3.7472
43327.95

Minimum
29.384
0.0773
668.48
1
2.3002
1.1651
0.0629
6.0024
265.3200
2.4728
0

Maximum
73.842
1.000
8025.20
15
21.240
2.9675
0.1708
757.6888
757.6888
5.8504
278,784.0
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Table 2. Summary of model estimates and standard errors
Item

Parameter

Price equation:

Mean conjectural variation:
Demand equation:

Market-power effect:
Cost-efficiency effect:
Total effect:
Efficiency-concentration effect:
Notes:

θ0
θ1
11
22
33
β1
β2
β3
θ = θ0 + θ1herf
d0
d1
d2
d3
d4
mpe
efe
mpe + efe
dee

Estimate
31.492a

–32.475a
0.186
–117.317
–1160.360
–0.014b
0.105
–1.521
22.999a
8.803a
–0.009a
0.0004a
0.00004a
–0.094a
1809.59a
–908.499a
901.091
8E – 7a

9.422
9.558
5.984
111.622
1511.5
0.005
0.092
1.189
6.934
0.130
0.002
0.0001
0.00001
0.0189
33.701
124.022
128.902
5E – 8

a = Statistically significant at the 99% level.
b = Statistically significant at the 95% level.

(14)
and
efc = 2shipment(β1rpelec + β2rpfuel + β3rwage)

(15)

From Equation 7, the differential efficiency effect (dee) is
(16)
V. Results
Results of the analysis are shown in Table 2. The first
group of parameters is for the price equation. The first
two parameters in this group are used to form θ, the conjectural variation measure. Results for the linear specification are θ = 31.492 – 32.475 herf. The mean conjectural
variation is about 23 and is highly significant. The conjectural variation is also statistically greater than zero for
all values of the Herfindahl Index below 0.90. This holds
for all but two observations in the sample. Apparently
conjectures are more collusive than Cournot.
The ′ik’s and β′i’s in Table 2 form the marginal cost
part of the price equation. Only β1 is statistically significant by itself. However, since the industry marginal
cost function is a complex aggregation of the underlying firm-level marginal cost functions, it is difficult to
exactly interpret the meaning of these parameters. Parameter estimates do suggest that marginal costs are un5 The

Standard error

ambiguously increasing in fuel costs.5 Since fuel is the
predominant input, this result is reassuring.
The second group of parameters in Table 2 is for the
demand equation. These results are more easily interpreted. Demand is downward sloping in price. The parameter d1 is the semidemand-elasticity. (Recall that d1
= (dQ/dP) × (1/Q)). If the full elasticity is calculated by
multiplying d1 by the mean of price, the resulting elasticity is 0.45, well in the inelastic range. This is a reasonable result. Demand is increasing in both highway and
nonhighway construction expenditures. It is decreasing in the price for the substitute input, asphalt. This final result is contrary to expectation. However, as Rosenbaum points out, the price of asphalt may be proxying
for general fuel costs.
The bottom part of the Table 2 contains the results
that are the main focus of this analysis. The MarketPower Effect, mpe, measures the impact that concentration-induced changes in market power have on price.
This effect is positive and significant. When concentration (as measured by the Herfindahl Index) increases,
prices will increase as a result of the implied increase in
market power. The coefficient on mpe is 1810. Multiplying by herf/rprice when both are evaluated at their mean
values gives an approximation of an elasticity that measures relative changes in price associated with relative
changes in market power. This elasticity is roughly 9.0,
suggesting that every 1% increase in the Herfindahl Index increases prices by about 9% due to changes in market power.
The Cost Efficiency Effect, efe, measures the impact
that concentration-induced changes in efficiency have

derivative of marginal cost with respect to the price of input i is ∂cj/∂νi = ii + 2HQβi .
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on price. This effect is negative and significant. When
concentration increases, prices decrease as a result of the
implied greater production efficiency. This result is reasonable in cement markets since larger firms are associated with larger kilns which benefit from economies of
scale and more efficient technologies. The coefficient on
efe is –908. Multiplying by the mean of herf/price gives
an elasticity that measures relative changes in price associated with relative changes in cost efficiency. The
elasticity equals –4.5; suggesting that every 1% increase
in the Herfindahl Index decreases prices by about 4.5%
due to increases in market efficiency.
Comparing the two impacts, the efficiency effect is
about half as great as the market power effect. Combining the efficiency and market power effects, the overall
coefficient of change in price with a change in the Herfindahl Index is 901 and statistically significant. The overall
elasticity measuring the relative change in price associated with relative changes in the Herfindahl Index is 4.5.
When the price lowering effects of increased efficiency are
combined with the price rising effects of increased market
power, the overall impact is that every 1% increase in the
Herfindahl Index increases prices by about 4.5%.
The last estimate in Table 2 shows the differential efficiency effect. This measures the change in the Herfindahl Index with a change in the variance in costs across
firms in the market. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant, but it is fairly small at 8E–7. However, the elasticity at the mean is about 0.13, suggesting
that a 7.7% increase in cost variance increases the Herfindahl Index by 1%. Table 1 shows that the maximum
of the cost variance measure is more than six times the
mean. Hence, there can be fairly large disparities in cost
variance across markets and, as a result, fairly large disparities in concentration.
VI . Conclusion
A persistent question in industrial economics is the
underpinning of the link between market concentration
and price. Does market power increase price or does
market efficiency reduce it? This paper develops a theoretical model to examine that link. It advances a model
that separates concentration into a market power component and an efficiency component. The model is parameterized and applied to the US portland cement industry. The results indicate that both impacts matter.
When changes in concentration enhance market power,
it leads to higher prices. When changes in concentration enhance relative efficiency, it leads to lower prices.
In relative terms, however, the market power effect is
twice as large as the efficiency effect. Hence, when concentration increases, prices rise. These results will create
a dilemma for merger policy. Apparently the beneficial
efficiency effects of mergers are outweighed by the detrimental market power effects.
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Appendix
The analysis examines data from 25 metropolitan
markets over the period 1972 through 1989.6 Each of the
metropolitan markets consists of a major metropolitan
area and all Portland cement plants located within 200
miles of the central city.
The Portland Cement Association (PCA), in its Plant
Information Summary, provides the following information for practically all cement plants in the USA:
plant location, the year when kilns at a plant were constructed, kiln capacity, and the technology used by each
kiln. These data provide the basis for calculating most of
the necessary variables.
Price (rprice) The US Department of the Interior in its
Minerals Yearbook publishes data on the value and volume of cement shipped, aggregated to either states or
subregions of states. Dividing value by volume gives a
transaction price. A market price is then calculated for
each metropolitan market in each year by weighting the
price in each state within the market by the percentage
of the market’s capacity located in that state. The average price is then deflated by the Producer Price Index
(PPI) with 1982 as a base year to obtain an estimate of
the real transaction price per ton of cement.7
To obtain the capacity weights, data from the PCA’s
Plant Information Summary are used. From these data
(described above), the percentage of a market’s capacity located within each state can be determined. These
percentages become the weights in converting all statelevel data to market-level data.
Shipments (shipment) The US Department of the Interior, in its Minerals Yearbook, also publishes data on kiln
capacities by region. For each Minerals Yearbook region,
the volume of shipments is divided by capacity to obtain
a shipments-to-capacity ratio. The PCA data are then
used to form metropolitan market shipment to capacity
ratios. For each market, the Minerals Yearbook shipmentsto-capacity ratio is multiplied by the PCA market capacity to get a measure of market shipments in millions of
tons. Finally, imports are added to get total shipments.
Real Highway Construction Expenditures (rhwy)
Highway construction expenditures, in current dollars,
for each metropolitan market can be obtained from the
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census’s
City Government Finances. They are deflated by the PPI
to obtain real values in millions of dollars.
Real NonHighway Construction Expenditures (rnhwy) Nonhighway expenditures are the sum of residen-

6
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tial and nonresidential, nonhighway construction expenditures. Current dollar new residential construction
expenditures, by city, are published by the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census in Housing
Authorized by Building Permits and Public Contracts. Current dollar nonresidential, nonhighway construction
expenditures, by city, are published in the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census’s Construction Review. The two values are summed and deflated
by the PPI to produce annual real values in millions of
dollars.
Real Price of Asphalt (rpasph) State-level asphalt
prices, in dollars per million Btu, are obtained from the
Energy Price and Expenditure Data Report published by
the US Department of Energy. The state-level data are
weighted by relative kiln capacities to get metropolitan
market data. These are deflated by the PPI to get real
values.
Real Price of Electricity (rpelec) State-level electricity prices for the industrial sector, in dollars per million
Btu, are obtained from the Energy Price and Expenditure
Data Report published by the US Department of Energy.
The state-level data are weighted by relative kiln capacities to get metropolitan market data. These are deflated
by the PPI to get real values.
Real Wage (rwage) State-level average hourly wages
for nonsupervisory workers in all manufacturing industries are obtained from the US Department of Labor’s Employment Hours and Earnings. The metropolitan
region real wage rate is derived by weighting the state
level data by the share of the kiln capacity located in
each state, then deflated by CPI. This real wage is adjusted by the national cement output index to reflect
the change in the average productivity of labor over
time.
Real Price of Fuel (rpfuel) Cement manufacturers
predominantly use either coal or natural gas as kiln fuels. In 1979, for example, 92.8% of fuel was either coal or
natural gas (PCA, Energy Report, 1980). State-level prices
for both coal and natural gas, in dollars per million Btu,
are obtained from the Energy Price and Expenditure Data
Report published by the US Department of Energy. They
are then weighted by relative kiln capacities to get metropolitan market data. The PCA’s Energy Report shows
the yearly national relative use of coal and natural gas as
kiln fuels. The metropolitan market prices for each type
of fuel are weighted by their yearly respective uses to
calculate fuel prices per million Btu. These are deflated
by the PPI to get real values.

The cities are Atlanta, Baltimore, Birmingham, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, Denver, Detroit, Kansas
City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Minneapolis, New Orleans, New York City, Oklahoma City, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Salt
Lake City and Seattle.

7 The

Producer Price Index data are from The Statistical Abstract of the United States (US Department of Commerce), various issues.
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Herfindahl Index (herf) The Herfindahl Index is a capacity-based Herfindahl index. The capacity-based market shares are derived from PCA Plant Information Summary data.
Number of Firms (nfirm) This is the number of firms
in a market in any particular year as measured from the
PCA Plant Information Summary.
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Variance in Costs (varcost) Costs are assumed to vary
as a function of kiln size. Larger kilns tend to be newer,
benefit from scale economies and use more efficient
technologies. The variance in costs is proxied by the
variance in kiln size in a market in any particular year.
Kiln sizes in millions of tons are obtained from the PCA
Plant Information Summary.

